People v. Randazzo [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
4-30-1957
People v. Randazzo [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "People v. Randazzo [DISSENT]" (1957). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 76.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/76
484 PEOPLE V. RANDAZZO [48 C.2d 
not be." (Aebli v. Board of Education, 62 Cal.App.2d 706, 
725 [145 P.2d 601]; see also 70 C .• J.S. § 156, p. 365.) This 
appears to be such a case. Sinee plaintiff's action was 
filed within less than three years after the erroneous interest 
payments to defendant, we eonclude that it was not barred. 
'l'he judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
J., and McComb, J., coneurred. 
[Crim. No. 5996. ln Bank. Apr. 30, 1957.] 
THE PEOPJ_,E, Respondent, v. DONAJ_,D RICHARD 
RANDAZZO, Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Remittitur-RecalL-An order of an 
appellate court recalling a remittitur and setting the appeal for 
further hearing is an interlocutory order that does not estab-
lish the law of the case for further proceedings therein. 
[2] !d.-Appeal- Remittitur- RecalL-Although the issues of 
fraud, mistake or inadvertence on which the recall of a re-
mittitur depend are distinct from the issues on the merits of 
the appeal, they are usually so closely related thereto that the 
court can determine them only by a review of its decision on 
the merits. 
[3] Id.-Appeal-Remittitur-Recall.-Given the strong policy in 
favor of finality of appellate judgments after the going down 
of the remittitur and the fact that the court must be free to 
review the grounds of its decision recalling the remittitur 
properly to dispose of the merits, if it determines on further 
consideration that the remittitur should not have been recalled, 
it has the power to and must vacate its order of recall instead 
of redeciding the case on the merits. 
[4] Id.-Appeal-Remittitur-Recall.-Where implicit in the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal's reversal of a judgment was its rede-
termination of the correctness of its recall of the remittitur, 
and such issue is before the Supreme Court by virtue of its 
order of transfer, the fact that the Supreme Court denied a 
hearing following the order of recall is immaterial, since such 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 678 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-5, 10, 11] Criminal Law, § 14.'55; [6] 
Indictment and Information, §§ 22, 28; [7] Indictment and In-
formation, § 28; [8] Indictment and Information, § 37; [9] Kid-
naping, § 6. 
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denial of hearing constituted only an exercise of its discre-
tionary power to transfer or refuse to transfer a cause to the 
Supreme Court that is pending in a District Court of Appeal. 
(Disapproving statement in Municipal Bond Co. v. City of River-
side, 4 Cal.App.2d 442, 4"15 [41 P.2d 215], that determination of 
issues on au order recalling a remittitur becomes law of the 
case.) 
[5] Id.-Appeal-Remittitur-Recall.-An error of law does not 
authorize the recall of a remittitur. 
[6] Indictment and Information-Charging O:ffense.-An informa-
tion is sufficient if it charges defendant with the commission of 
a public oitense in words sufficient to give him notice of the 
offense of which he is accused (Pen. Code, § 952); only the 
essential elements of the offense need be charged. 
[7] Id.- Charging Offense.- Notice of the particular manner, 
means, place or circumstances of the offense charged is given, 
not by detailed pleading·, but by the transcript of the evidence 
before the committing magistrate. 
[8] Id.-Surplusage.-Surplusage does not vitiate an information 
and may be rejected if enough remains to charge the offense. 
[9] Kidnaping-Indictment and Information.-Those parts of a 
count stating that defendant did "seize, confine, abduct, con-
ceal" and "did hold and detain said [designated victim], with 
intent and for the purpose of committing robbery" were not 
chargeable as public offenses under Pen. Code, § 209, defining 
kidnaping for the purpose of robbery as amended in 1951, but 
if these parts were omitted as surplusage the count would 
still charge the offense of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery 
in violation of § 209 as amended and give defendant ample 
notice of the offense of which he was accused; if the offense 
was not stated with sufficient clarity to enable him to present 
his defense, he should have demurred. 
[10] Criminal Law-Appeal- Remittitur- RecalL-Defendant's 
complaint that erroneous instructions were given would not 
authorize the recall of a remittitur, since it is merely a com-
plaint of an error of law and judicial error, and a remittitur 
will not be reeallrd to correct judicial error or mistake of law; 
any objection defendant had to the instructions should have 
been raised on appeal from the judgment of conviction. 
[11] Id.-Appeal-Remittitur-Recall.-Where the District Court 
of Appeal should have vacated its order recalling a remittitur 
and not redecided the case on the merits, the correct disposi-
tion after granting a petition for hearing is for the Supreme 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Indictment and Information, § 36 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Indictment and Information, § 51 et seq. 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Kidnaping, § 13. 
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Court to return the proceeding to the District Court of Appeal 
with appropriate directions to vacate the order recalling the 
remittitur and to reissue the remittitur on its decision affirm-
ing the judgment. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Kenneth C. Newell and Benjamin J. Schein-
man, ,Judges. Proceedings transferred to District Court of 
Appeal with directions. 
Prosecution for robbery and kidnaping for the purpose of 
robbery. Proceedings transferred to District Court of Ap-
peal with directions. 
Morris Lavine for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Miller, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was charged by information in 
two counts, robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) in Count I and kid-
naping for the purpose of robbery (Pen. Code, § 209) in 
Count II, and was found by a jury to be guilty on both 
counts as charged. The conviction was affirmed by the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 
One, on March 29, 1955. (People v. Randazzo, 132 Cal.App. 
2d 20 [281 P.2d 289] .) A petition for rehearing in the 
District Court of Appeal was denied, a subsequent petition for 
hearing in this court was also denied, and the remittitur issued 
on April 29, 1955. 
On May 10, 1956, defendant filed with the District Court 
of Appeal a "Motion to Recall the Remittitur, Reinstate Ap-
peal, and Consider Supplemental or Amended Petiti0r. for 
He hearing.'' This motion was granted as to Count II only 
and the attorney general's petition for rehearing was denied. 
The attorney general then petitioned for a hearing in this 
court. Since the appeal was already set for hearing in the 
District Court of Appeal, we denied the petition because of 
our unwillingness to interfere until the District Court of 
Appeal had come to a final decision. 
On October 16, 1956, the District Court of Appeal issued 
its order reversing the judgment of conviction as to Count 
II, stating as its basis the same ground that it had used in 
granting the motion to recall the remittitur, that ''the opinion 
of this court ... affirming a conviction of 'life imprison-
Apr.1957} PEOPLE v. RANDAZZO 
[48 C.2d 484; 310 P.2d 413] 
487 
ment without possibility of parole' for the crime of kidnaping 
'with intent and for the purpose of committing robbery,' 
under Section 209 of the Penal Code, was erroneously predi-
cated upon said statute as it existed prior to 1951, and prior 
to defendant's alleged criminal acts, whereas said statute, as 
amended in 1951, does not make it an offense separate from 
robbery, to hold or detain a person for the purpose of com-
mitting robbery .... " .A petition for rehearing in the Dis-
trict Court of .Appeal was denied, and the case is now before 
us after the granting of a petition for hearing in this court. 
It is contended at the outset that the order of the District 
Court of Appeal recalling its remittitur now constitutes a 
final order reinstating the appeal and that therefore, follow-
ing the transfer of the cause, this court is precluded from 
reviewing the order recalling the remittitur and must decide 
the appeal on the merits. [1] We believe, however, that an 
order of an appellate court recalling a remittitur and setting 
the appeal for further hearing is an interlocutory order that 
does not establish the law of the case for further proceedings 
therein. In this respect it is analogous to an order of a trial 
court sustaining or overruling a demurrer to the complaint, 
which does not become binding on it. (Berri v. Superior 
Court, 43 Cal.2d 856, 860 [279 P.2d 8], and cases cited.) 
[2] Although the issues of fraud, mistake, or inadvertence 
on which the recall of a remittitur depend are distinct from 
the issues on the merits of the appeal, they are usually so 
closely related thereto that the court can determine them only 
by a review of its decision on the merits. (See Southwestern 
Inv. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 623, 628-629 [241 
P.2d 985]; Isenberg v. Sherman, 214 Cal. 722, 732 [7 P.2d 
1006] ; Davis v. Basalt Rock Co., 114 Cal.App.2d 300, 304-
310 [250 P.2d 254]; Kahle v. Sinnett, 136 Cal.App.2d 34, 
38-40 [288 P.2d 139] .) If the court was bound by its tenta-
tive decision that a fraud had been perpetrated upon it or 
that it had been inadvertent or mistaken, it would be fore-
closed from the full review of the case implicit in its order 
for reconsideration. [3] Given the strong policy in favor 
of finality of appellate judgments after the going down of 
the remittitur, and the fact that the court must be free to 
review the grounds of its decision recalling the remittitur 
properly to dispose of the merits, we conclude that if it de-
termines on further consideration that the remittitur should 
not have been recalled, it has the power to and must vacate 
its order of recall instead of redeciding the case on the merits. 
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(See Southwestern Inv. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 
38 Cal.2d 623, 626; Chin Ott Wong v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 
91 C'al.App.2d 1, 3 [204 P.2d 387]; E.r parte Gallagher, 101 
Cal. 113, 114 [35 P. 449] .) [4] Accordingly, implicit in the 
District Court of Appeal's reversal of the judgment herein 
was its redetermination of the correctness of its recall of the 
remittitur, and that issue is now before this court by virtue 
of our order of transfer. In this respect, the fact that we 
denied a hearing following the order of recall is immaterial, 
since our denial of hearing constituted only an exercise of our 
discretionary power to transfer or refuse to transfer a cause 
to this court that is pending in a District Court of Appeal. 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4c.) Cases holding that an order 
denying a motion to dismiss an appeal becomes the law of the 
case (see George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 
850-851 [205 P.2d 1037], and cases cited) are not inconsistent 
with our conclusion herein, for in such cases the issues on the 
motion and merits respectively are ordinarily distinct and the 
policy in favor of finality of judgments is not involved. The 
statement in Municipal Bond Co. v. City of Riverside, 4 Cal. 
App.2d 442, 445 [ 41 P.2d 215], that the determination of 
issues on an order recalling a remittitur becomes the law of 
the case was not necessary to the decision therein and is dis-
approved. 
The order of the District Court of Appeal granting the 
motion to recall the remittitur as to Count II, ordering the 
judgment on that count vacated and the remittitur recalled, 
shows on its face that it was based on an error of law. 
[5] It is settled that an error of law does not authorize the 
recall of a remittitur. (Southwestern Inv. Corp. v. City of 
Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.2d 623, 626, and cases cited.) 
Moreover, it is clear from its first opinion that the District 
Court of Appeal reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence in 
the light of the provisions of Penal Code, section 209, as they 
read at the time the alleged crime was committed. Thus, both 
defendant and the attorney general briefed the case with 
reference to the code section as amended, and the District 
Court of Appeal quoted defendant's contention that he was 
not guilty of kidnaping to commit robbery "under Section 
209, Penal Code, as amended in 1951," set forth the facts that 
the victim was kidnaped after the service station was robbed, 
and quoted with approval the argument in the attorney gen-
eral's brief that defendant was guilty under section 209 as 
amended on the ground that 
Apr.1957] PEOPLE v. RANDAZZO 
[48 C.2d 484; 310 P.2d 413] 
489 
''·where a kidnaping takes place after the actual perpetra-
tion of a robbery such kidnaping may be a kidnaping for the 
purpose of robbery if it may reasonably be inferred that the 
transportation of the victim was to effect the eseape of the 
robber or to remove the victim to another place where he might 
less easily sound an alarm. 
"People v. Kristy, 4 Cal.2d 504, 507-508 [50 P.2d 798]. 
"People v. Raucho, 8 Cal.App.2d 655, 665-666 [47 P.2d 
1108]. 
"People v. Bean, 88 Cal.App.2d 34,40-41 [198 P.2d 379]." 
(132 Cal.App.2d at p. 24.) 
Defendant contends that the judgment of conviction on 
Count II was void and that he was denied due process of 
law on the ground that he was convicted of an offense un-
known to the law. In support of this contention he urges that 
the information failed to state a public offense since it was 
couched in the language of section 209 prior to its amendment 
in 1951 and that the jury was instructed aceording to the law 
prior to the amendment. 
At no time during the course of the appeal, in his brief 
on appeal, or his petitions for rehearing and hearing, did de-
fendant, who was then represented by the same counsel as he 
is now, make any attack upon the information, nor did he 
point out any inaccuracy or other impropriety of the instruc-
tions that he now complains of. He merely asserted, so far as 
the instructions on kidnaping for the purpose of robbery 
were concerned, that none should have been given on that 
subject on the ground that the evidence would not support a 
conviction of that crime. No explanation is offered for his 
failure to raise these points during the appeal or before the 
issuance of the remittitur, or for his delay for more than a year 
after the remittitur issued in seeking to set it aside. 
[6] An information is sufficient if it charges the de-
fendant with the commission of a public offense in words 
sufficient to give him notice of the offense of which he is ac-
cused. (People v. Roberts, 40 Cal.2d 483, 486-487 [254 P.2d 
501] ; Pen. Code, § 952.) Only the essential elements of the 
offense need be charged. (People v. Britton, 6 Cal.2d 1, 5 [56 
P.2d 494] .) [7] Notice of the particular manner, means, 
place or circumstances of the offense is given, not by detailed 
pleading, but by the transcript of the evidence before the com-
mitting magistrate. (People v. Pierce, 14 Cal.2d 639, 646 [96 
P.2d 784).) [8] Surplusage, however, does not vitiate the 
information and may be rejected if enough remains to charge 
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the offense. (People v. Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 371 [203 P. 78] ; 
People v. Walton, 70 Cal.App.2d Supp. 862, 865 [161 P.2d 
498], and cases cited.) 
At the time the crime was committed Penal Code, section 
209 provided: "Any person who seizes, confines, inveigles, 
entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps, or carries away 
any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold 
or detain or who holds or detains, such individual for ransom, 
re·ward or to commit extortion or to exact from relatives or 
friends of such person any money or valuable thing, or any 
person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit 
robbery, or any person who aids or abets any such act, is 
guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall suffer 
death or shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison 
for life without possibility of parole, at the discretion of the 
jury trying the same, in cases in which the person or persons 
subjected to such kidnaping suffers or suffer bodily harm 
or shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 
life with possibility of parole in cases where such person or 
persons do not suffer bodily harm.'' 
In Count II of the amended information it was charged 
that "For a further and separate cause of action, being a dif-
ferent offense of the same class of crimes and offenses as the 
charge set forth in Count I hereof, the said DoNALD RICHARD 
RANDAzzo is accused by the District Attorney of and for the 
County of Los Angeles, State of California, by this amended 
information, of the crime of KIDNAPING FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
ROBBERY, a felony, committed as follows: That the said DoNALD 
RicHARD RANDAzzo on or about the 14th day of September 
1953, at and in the County of Los Angeles, State of Cali-
fornia, did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously seize, con-
fine, abduct, conceal, kidnap and carry away Ed Hallmark, 
an individual, with the intent to hold and detain, and who did 
hold and detain, said Ed Hallmark, with intent and for the 
purpose of committing robbery. 
''That said Ed Hallmark so kidnaped was subjected to and 
did suffer bodily harm by said DoNALD RICHARD RANDAzzo." 
[9] The part of the foregoing count that defendant did 
"seize, confine, abduct, conceal" and "who did hold and de-
tain said Ed Hallmark, with intent and for the purpose of 
committing robbery," are not chargeable as public offenses 
under Penal Code, section 209, as amended. If these parts 
of the count are disregarded as surplusage, however (People 
v. Steelik, supra, 187 Cal. 361, 371), Count II would still 
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charge the offense of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery 
in violation of section 209 as amended and give defendant 
ample notice of the offense of which he was accused, for it 
would then read: " ... that the said DoNALD RICHARD RAN-
DAZZO on or about the 14th day of September, 1953, at and 
in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, did will-
fully, unlawfully and feloniously . . . kidnap and carry away 
Ed Hallmark, an individual, ... with intent and for the 
purpose of committing robbery.'' If the offense was not stated 
with sufficient clarity to enable defendant to present his de-
fense, he should have demurred on one or more of the grounds 
set forth in Penal Code, section 1004. (People v. Schoeller, 
96 Cal.App.2d 61, 62 [214 P.2d 565]; People v. Waid, 127 
Cal.App.2d 614, 616-617 [274 P.2d 217].) 
[10] Defendant's complaint that erroneous instructions 
were given would not authorize the recall of the remittitur, 
for it is a complaint of an error of law and judicial error 
only, and a remittitur will not be recalled to correct judicial 
error or mistake of law. Any objection defendant had to the 
instructions should have been raised on his appeal from the 
judgment of conviction. (People v. Whitton, 112 Cal.App. 
2d 328, 332 [246 P.2d 60] .) 
[11] It follows from the foregoing that the District Court 
of Appeal should have vacated its order reca11ing the re-
mittitur and not redecided the case on the merits. Since the 
motion to recall the remittitur was made to the District Court 
of Appeal, however, the correct disposition after granting 
the petition for hearing is to return the proceeding to that 
court with appropriate directions. (Southwestern Inv. Corp. 
v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.2d 623, 630.) Accorrl-
ingly, the cause is transferred to the District Court of Ap-
peal, Second Appellate District, Division One, with directions 
to :file its order vacating its order recalling the remittitur and 
to reissue the remittitur on its decision affirming the judgment. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
SHENK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
conclusion of the majority that the judgment as to Count II 
should be affirmed. However, I am convinced that the judg-
ment of affirmance should be rendered by this court and 
not by the District Court of Appeal upon remand with di-
rections or otherwise; and I agree with the discussion and 
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conclusions of Mr. Justice Carter on this point in his dis-
senting opinion. I wish to emphasize the confusion which in 
my opinion the prevailing opinion has injected into the prac-
tice and procedure in situations of this sort and that in this 
respect the opinion is not constitutionally sound. 
It is noted that the defendant was charged by information 
in two counts, robbery in Count I and kidnapping for the 
purpose of robbery in Count II. He was convicted on both 
counts and separate sentences were pronounced. On appeal 
to the District Court of Appeal the judgment as to both counts 
was affirmed. A petition for rehearing in that court was 
denied and a petition for hearing in this court was denied. 
The defendant moved the District Court of Appeal to recall 
the remittitur as to Count II only on the ground that the 
judgment on that count was void; that it had been improvi-
dently made upon an innocent false suggestion; that it has 
been based on a mistake of fact; that it had been made 
through inadvertence on the part of the court and counsel, 
and that it had resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The 
motion was granted and the remittitur was recalled as to 
Count II. The appeal as to that count was reinstated and 
was set down for rehearing. The judgment on Count I be-
came final. The attorney general filed a petition for hearing 
in this court following the order recalling the remittitur. 
That petition was denied. The appeal as to Count II was 
reconsidered by the District Court of Appeal and the judg-
ment as to that count was reversed. A petition for a hearing 
as to that judgment was granted and the cause was thereby 
transferred to this court. 
It may not be denied that the District Court of Appeal 
had jurisdiction to entertain the motion to recall the re-
mittitur. It is also beyond question that the motion was a 
"cause" as contemplated by the Constitution and was subject 
to transfer to this court on petition for hearing. This court 
entertained such a petition and denied it. The power of each 
court to act in each instance was present and when this 
court denied the petition for hearing the question of the 
propriety of the order of recall was settled and became either 
the law of the case or res judicata. Thereafter the appeal 
as to Count II was before the District Court of Appeal the 
same as if no judgment had been rendered by that court 
therein and as if no remittitur had issued. Thereafter that 
eourt reversed the judgment based on Count II. When this 
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court granted a hearing the judgment of the District Court 
of Appeal was thereby set aside and the appeal was pending 
in this court the same as on original appeal and subject to 
disposition as such. Whatever occurred in the District Court 
of Appeal on the motion to recall the remittitur had been 
finally settled and this court should now determine the appeal 
on its merits. 
If the petition for hearing after the decision of the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in recalling the remittitur had been 
granted the disposition of that matter might have taken the 
course followed in Southwestern Inv. Co1·p. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 623 [241 P.2d 985]. But such is not this 
case. When this court denied the petition to review the order 
of the District Court of Appeal in recalling the remittitur 
the question whether the order of recall was rightly or wrongly 
granted faded from the case and was no longer subject to 
reconsideration. Notwithstanding that fact the majority now 
directs the District Court of Appeal to vacate its order re-
calling the remittitur, to reinstate its original judgment and 
to affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
It should be remembered that this court has no appellate 
jurisdiction as such over the judgments of the District Courts 
of Appeal. The method of review is by petition for hearing. 
In the absence of an order of transfer to this court pursuant 
thereto, those judgments become final by operation of law. 
When an order of transfer is entered the appeal is then 
pending not in the District Court of Appeal but in this 
court for determination. The majority opinion states that 
the District Court of Appeal "lost jurisdiction" of the appeal 
upon the issuance of the remittitur and was without juris-
diction to recall it. That question was inherent in the peti-
tion for hearing in this court to set aside the order recalling 
the remittitur and has long since become final. It is not a 
matter for review on the appeal from the judgment, which 
is the only matter now before us. 
Further confusion is infused into the law by calling the 
order of the District Court of Appeal in recalling the re-
mittitur an "interlocutory order." Such an order is one 
that imports a lack of finality in the disposition of the matter 
involved. Here the question of the finality of the order of 
recall became final and the order can in no sense be deemed 
"interlocutory." That term has a well known and definite 
meaning, usually provided for by statute, and has no applica-
tion to a final disposition of the appeal now before us. 
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On the merits the record supports the judgment and it 
should be affirmed by order of this court. 
MeComb, ,J., eoneurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion is predicated upon the theory that 
the recall of a remittitur by an appellate court is a mere 
interlocutory order and is analogous to an order of a trial 
court sustaining or overruling a demurrer to a complaint. 
In this connection it cites and relies upon Berri v. Superior 
Court, 43 Cal.2d 836 [279 P.2d 8], which holds that an order 
sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not a final 
order and may be changed by the court at any time before 
judgment is entered in accordance therewith. The holding 
of the majority in this respect is elearly unsound as it fails 
to give consideration to the basic problems involved in a 
proceeding for the recall of a remittitur. It has been re-
peatedly held that when a remittitur is issued and filed in 
the court below, the appellate court loses jurisdiction of 
the cause and thereafter has no power to modify or change 
its decision or judgment unless and until the remittitur is 
recalled aud its jurisdiction is restored. This court has re-
cently reannounced the rule as to when and upon what con-
ditions a remittitur may be recalled. In Southwestern Inv. 
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 623 [241 P.2d 985], 
this court stated at page 626: ''That a remittitur may be 
recalled on the reviewing court's own motion, on motion or 
petition after notice supported by affidavits, or on stipulation 
setting forth the facts which will justify the granting of 
the order is now determined by rule. (Rule 25 (d), Rules on 
Appeal; 36 Cal.2d at p. 22.) The question as to when the 
facts constitute grounds for the granting of the motion is 
resolved by the case law. Other than for the correction of 
clerical errors, the recall may be ordered on the ground of 
fraud, mistake or inadvertence. The recall may not be granted 
to correct judicial error.'' Recent decisions of the District 
Courts of Appeal are to the same effect (Davis v. Basalt 
Rock Co., 114 Cal.App.2d 300 [250 P.2d 254] ; Kohle v. 
Sinnett, 136 Cal.App.2d 34 [288 P.2d 139]). Therefore, 
having in mind that as a general rule an appellate court 
cannot exercise any jurisdiction over a cause in which the 
remittitur has been issued by its order and filed in the court 
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below, and that the office of the remittitur is to return the 
proceedings which have been brought up by appeal to the 
court below, and when the remittitur has been duly filed, 
the proceedings from that time are pending in the trial court 
and not in the appellate court, and that as to such pro-
ceedings it is not competent for the appellate court to make 
any further order until the remittitur is recalled by it (Kohlp, 
v. Sinnett, supTa), it should be apparent that an order 
granting a motion for the recall of a remittitur issued by 
an appellate court is something more than a mere inter-
locutory order such as an order sustaining or overruling a 
demurrer. This must be the situation because, until such an 
order is made, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to 
act in the case ( Ch1:n Ott Wong v. Title Ins. & Tntst Co., 
91 Oal.App.2d 1 [204 P .2d 387]). It must necessarily follow, 
therefore, that when an order is made by an appellate court 
recalling a remittitur issued by it, the effect of such order 
is to restore jurisdiction of the cause in that court. True, 
it may have erroneously granted such order, but if so, the 
error would be one committed within the exercise of its 
jurisdietion, and when such an order becomes final, it is not 
snbjeet to collateral attack. In this respeet, an order made 
by an appellate court recalling a remittitur is analogous to 
an order made by sueh a court denying a motion to dismiss 
an appeal (GeoTge v. Bekins Van & Stomge Co., 33 Oal.2d 
834 [205 P.2d 1037) ). Either of them may be based on facts 
outside of the record. Following either the eourt must make 
its decision on the merits of the case on appeal. 
The majority erroneously assumes that the issues which 
may be involved on a motion for the reeall of a remittitur 
are usually so closely related to the issues on the merits of 
the appeal that the court can determine them only by a 
review of its decision on the merits. There is no basis in 
either lavv or fact for this assumption. On the other hand, 
let us assume that in support of a motion to recall a re-
mittitur issued by a District Oonrt of Appeal the moving 
party made out a clear case of extrinsic fraud by a showing 
that he was falsely indueed by the adverse party to absent 
himself from the hearing before the District Oonrt of Appeal 
and that the adverse party falsely represented to the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal that the moving party waived any 
right to a dec·ision in his favor by the appellate court and 
the appellate court acted upon such misrepresentation to 
the detriment of the moving party who did not learn of the 
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deception and fraud until after the issuance of the remittitur. 
Assume that upon such showing the District Court of Appeal 
recalled and set aside its remittitur and this court thereafter 
denied a petition for hearing of the cause and the order 
granting the motion to recall and set aside the remittitur 
became final. vV ould this court hold in such a case that 
on petition for hearing after the District Court of Appeal 
had rendered its decision on the merits that its prior decision 
recalling and setting aside the remittitur could then be re-
viewed by this court? I have grave doubt that it would so 
hold, but under the holding in the majority opinion in this 
case, the order of an appellate court recalling a remittitur, 
even in the circumstances above recited, could be set aside 
by this court at any time regardless of the period of time 
which had elapsed since the remittit1lr was recalled. 
The majority cites and relies upon Southwestern Inv. Corp. 
v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 623 [241 P.2d 985]; Isenberg 
v. Sherman, 214 Cal. 722 [7 P.2d 1006] ; Davis v. Basalt 
Rock Co., 114 Cal.App.2d 300 [250 P.2d 254] ; Kohle v. 
Sinnett, 136 Cal.App.2d 34 [288 P.2d 139]. But in none of 
these cases had the order recalling the remittitur become 
final as it had in the ease at bar; that is, in every one of 
the last cited cases this court granted a hearing and trans-
ferred the cause from the District Court of Appeal to this 
court before the order made by the District Court of Appeal 
recalling tl1e remittitur had become final, and this eourt, there-
fore, had before it the eause in whieh the order was made 
granting the recall. Sueh being the ease, there was no col-
lateral attack upon the order recalling the remittitur as this 
court had the same power to review the order recalling the 
remittitur as the District Court of Appeal had when it 
heard the motion and made the order in the first instance. 
Such is not the situation here as the record discloses that 
on July 11, 1956, the District Court of Appeal rendered a 
decision in whieh it ordered that the remittitur be recalled. 
That decision is as follows: "It appearing from the record 
that the opinion of this court, filed March 29, 1955, affirming 
a conviction of 'life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole' for the crime of kidnapping 'with intent and for the 
purpose of committing robbery,' under section 209 of the 
Penal Code, was erroneously predicated upon said statute as 
it existed prior to 1951, prior to defendant's alleged criminal 
acts, in which year it was amended, whereas said statute, as 
amended in 1951, does not make it an offense separate from 
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robbery, to hold or detain a person for the purpose of com-
mitting robbery, good cause appearing, it is ordered that 
appellant's motion to recall the remittitur as to Count II 
is granted and it is ordered that the judgment heretofore 
entered (on March 29, 1955) as to said Count II is vacated 
and set aside and the remittitur issued thereon (April 29, 
1955) is recalled. 
"The appeal as to said Count II is ordered on calendar 
August 28, 1956, at 10 a. m., for consideration of an amended 
petition for rehearing as to the affirmance of the judgment 
rendered on said Count II." (143 Cal.App.2d 59 at page 60 
[299 P.2d 307].) 
It will be recalled that this court denied the petition of 
the attorney general to grant a hearing and review said de-
cision on August 8, 1956. Such denial had the effect of 
rendering the order recalling the remittitur a final judgment 
of the District Court of Appeal which should now be binding 
upon this court. 
In this respect the majority opinion states: ''We believe, 
however, that an order of an appellate court recalling a re-
mittitur and setting the appeal for further hearing is an 
interlocutory order that does not establish the law of the 
case for further proceedings therein.'' No authority is cited 
in support of this statement, and the only decided case on 
this subject is to the contrary. (See Municipal Bond Co. v. 
City of Riverside, 4 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 41 P.2d 215] .) The 
majority opinion purports to disapprove the holding in this 
case. 
In my opinion the order of the District Court of Appeal 
in recalling its remittitur here is res judicata and may not 
now be reexamined by this court. 'l'he case, however, is 
properly before this court on the merits as it was transferred 
to this court by an order granting a hearing on November 
14, 1956, after the decision of the District Court of Appeal 
rendered on the merits on Oetober 16, 1956, as follows: "It 
appearing that the opinion of this court, :filed March 29, 
1955, affirming a conviction of 'life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole' for the crime of kidnapping 'with in-
tent and for the purpose of committing robbery,' under sec-
tion 209 of the Penal Code, was erroneusly predicated upon 
said statute as it existed prior to 1951, and prior to de-
fendant's alleged criminal acts, whereas said statute, as 
amended in 1951, does not make it an offense separate from 
robbery, to hold or detain a person for the purpose of com-
498 PEOPLE V. RANDAZZO [ 48 C.2d 
mitting robbery, and the remittitur in said case having been 
recalled as to Count II by order of this court filed on July 
11, 1956 and the judgment as to Count II having been vacated 
by said order, and the matter now being submitted for decision, 
"It is hereby ordered, good cause appearing therefor, that 
the judgment appealed from, in respect to Count II, is hereby 
reversed." ( ( Cal.App.) 302 P .2d 39.) 
I agree with this decision and I find no answer to it in 
the majority opinion. 
In conclusion I wish to point out that the provision for 
transfer of causes from a District Court of Appeal to this 
court is stated in the Constitution.* The term ''cause'' is 
broad and includes any and all orders. It is said in In re 
Wells, 174 Cal. 467, 471 [163 P. 657]: "The particular 
clause involved here is that which gives the supreme court 
power 'to order any canse pending before a district court 
of appeal to be heard and determined by the supreme court.' 
The contention is that the matter before the district court 
was not a 'cause' within the meaning of that word as used 
in the above-quoted clause of the section. 
''. . . This provision has always been understood to apply 
to all cases, matters, and proceedings of every description. 
It has been the unvarying custom of the court in Bank to 
entertain an application for rehearing of any matter decided 
in department, regardless of its nature or character. The 
rule has been applied in original proceedings of all kinds, 
in motions to dismiss appeals and other matters, as well as 
in ordinary cases on appeal. The word 'cause,' in the clause 
above quoted, was understood to be broad enough to include 
everything that could possibly come before the department 
for decision. 
'' ... To describe the decisions subject to this power the 
*"The Supreme Court shall have power to order any cause pending 
before the Supreme Court to be heard and determined by a district 
court of appeal, and to order any cause pending before a district court 
of appeal to be heard and determined by the Supreme Court. The order 
last mentioned may be made before judgment has been pronounced 
by a district court of appeal, or within 15 days in criminal cases, or 
30 days in all other cases, after such judgment shall have become final 
therein. The judgment of the district courts of appeal shall become 
final therein upon the expiration of 15 days in criminal cases, or 30 
days in all other cases, after the same shall have been pronounced. 
"The Supreme Court shall have power to order causes pending before 
a district court of appeal for o11e district to be transferred to the 
district court of appeal for another district, or from one division 
thereof to another, for hearing and decision." (Cal. Const., art. vi, 
§ 4c.) 
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word 'cause' was selected. This was the word used in the 
clause of section 2 giving similar power over the department 
decisions, which, in that clause, as we have said, has been 
understood to apply to every matter that could be decided 
by a department. The familiar rule of construction requires 
that it be given a similarly broad meaning in the new pro-
vision, and to include every matter decided by a district 
court of appeal, and operating as a final decision or disposi-
tion thereof in that court. It is clear, therefore, that the 
power to transfer causes from the district court of appeal, to 
the supreme court, either before or after judgment in the 
district court of appeal, was intended to have this all-em-
bracing application." (Emphasis added.) 
From the foregoing discussion in the Wells case it seems 
clear that a motion to recall a remittitur in a District Court 
of Appeal is a cause within the purview of the above cited 
constitutional provision, and, therefore, when the District 
Court of Appeal rendered its decision on July 11, 1956, in 
which it "ordered that appellant's motion to recall the re-
mittitur as to Count II is granted and it is ordered that the 
judgment heretofore entered (on March 29, 1955) as to said 
Count II is vacated and set aside and the remittitur issued 
thereon (April 29, 1955) is recalled," it decided a cause 
pending in that court. Its decision in said cause became final 
30 days thereafter (under the former rule) unless an order 
was made by this court within that time transferring said 
cause to this court. Since no such order was made by this 
court, the decision of the District Court of Appeal in said 
cause became final and, like a decision of that court on a 
motion to dismiss an appeal, was not thereafter subject to 
review by this court. 
For the reasons above stated I would reverse the judgment 
as to Count II of the information. 
